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Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value pp 55–75Cite as

Dual agency: corporate boards with reciprocally interlocking relationships

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Abstract

This paper studies reciprocal interlocks of boards of directors of large firms where an employee of firm A sits on firm B’s board and at the same time an employee of firm B sits on firm A’s board. The study of Boards of Directors by those in economics and finance is not new. In fact, Dooley (1969) writes of interlocking directorates, but his definition is different in that he presents evidence of interlock where “at least one director... sat on the board of at least one other of the largest companies”. Books by Mizruchi (1982) and Pennings (1980) as well as many articles, for example Bearden and Mintz (1985), Bunting and Barbour (1971) and Mintz and Schwartz (1981). discuss interlocking boards in much more detail from a sociological perspective. Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) study the longitudinal formation of interlocking directorates using a small sample of firms.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

    Kevin F. Hallock

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  1. Kevin F. Hallock
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Stern School of Business, New York University, USA

    Jennifer Carpenter  & David Yermack  & 

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Hallock, K.F. (1999). Dual agency: corporate boards with reciprocally interlocking relationships. In: Carpenter, J., Yermack, D. (eds) Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value. The New York University Salomon Center Series on Financial Markets and Institutions, vol 4. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5192-5_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5192-5_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5041-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-5192-5

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