Advertisement

Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games

  • Wolfgang Leininger
  • Chun-Lei Yang

Abstract

The present paper analyses rent-seeking games in which competitors for a rent can act and react finitely or infinitely often. It argues for an infinite-move model as the most appropriate specification of a model of rent-seeking. Dynamic equilibrium analysis of this game suggests that wasteful expenditures in rent-seeking competitions are lower than previously studied static (simultaneous-move) games predict. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, C73.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Indifference Curve Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Reaction Curve Rent Dissipation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wolfgang Leininger
    • 1
    • 2
  • Chun-Lei Yang
    • 1
  1. 1.LS WirtschaftstheorieUniversität DortmundDortmundGermany
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBoston UniversityBostonUSA

Personalised recommendations