Abstract
In the multi-prior framework, we consider that there exist two sorts of information process: revision information and focusing information. The second one is standard in economics while the former cannot be defined when there is only one prior. In this paper, we provide a coherent defmition of “revising” information structure. We show that we get a positive value of information. A partial order for those revision information structures is also proposed.
We wish to thank Main Chateauneuf, Jean-Yves Jaffray and Bernard Walliser for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own.
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Chassagnon, A., Vergnaud, JC. (1999). A Positive Value of Information for a Non-Bayesian Decision-Maker. In: Machina, M.J., Munier, B. (eds) Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Making. Theory and Decision Library, vol 40. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-4592-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-4592-4_7
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