Non-Additive Beliefs: From Decision to Game Theory

  • Hans Haller
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLB, volume 40)


In game theory, the concept of a Nash equilibrium in capacities often permits a richer set of equilibrium predictions than Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Moreover, capacities can serve as a modelling tool for strategic uncertainty. However, four novel issues come up when the modelling device of non-additive probabilities (capacities) is transplanted from decision to game theory. First, there is the tension between the desire for more predictions versus the aim for more precise predictions (equilibrium refinements, equilibrium selection). The second important issue hitherto not addressed in decision theory is how to define the support of a capacity. A third important issue which does not arise in decision theory is the proper definition of product capacities. A fourth issue which is potentially important for both decision and game theory is the proper definition of conditional capacities.


Nash Equilibrium Decision Theory Expect Utility Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hans Haller
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityBlacksburgUSA

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