Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Institutional Complementarities and Conflicts between Wage Bargaining Institutions and an Independent Central Bank

  • Chapter
Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities

  • 246 Accesses

Abstract

This paper analyzes the literature on strategic interactions and proposes several avenues for future research. The consensus that institutions matter does not imply any clear agreement about what constitutes an adequate concept of institutions. The authors consider recent contributions on wage bargaining institutions and central banks in economics and political science from a conceptual point of view, identifying the main differences between sociological individualism and rational-choice individualism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Alesina, A. and L. Summers (1993), ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 25 (2): 151–163.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allsop, C. and D. Vines (2000), ‘The Assessment: Macroeconomic Policy’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 16 (4): 1–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barro, R. and R. Gordon (1983a), ‘Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy’, Journal of Monetary Economics 12: 101–122.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barro, R. and R. Gordon (1983b), ‘A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model’, Journal of Political Economy 91 (4): 589–610.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bleaney, M. (1996), ‘Central Bank Independence, Wage-Bargaining Structure, and Macroeconomic Performance in OECD Countries’, Oxford Economic Papers 48: 20–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Booth, A., M. Burda, L. Calmfors, D. Checchi, R. Naylor and J. Visser (2000), What do Unions Do in Europe? Prospects and Challenges for Union Presence and Union Influence. A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyer, R. and J. R. Hollingsworth (1997), ‘The Variety of Institutional Arrangements and their Complementarity in Modern Economics’, in J. R. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer (eds.), Contemporary Capitalism. The Embeddedness of Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Calmfors, L. and J. Driffill (1988), ‘Centralisation of Wage Bargaining and Macroeconomic Performance’, Economic Policy 6: 13–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Calmfors, L. (1998), ‘Macroeconomic Policy, Wage Setting, and Employment-What Difference Does the EMU Make?’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14 (3): 125–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Calmfors, L. (2001), ‘Unemployment, Labor Market Reform and Monetary Union’, Journal of Labor Economics 19 (2): 265–289.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cukierman, A. (1992), Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cukierman, A. and F. Lippi (1999), ‘Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment: Theory and Some Evidence’, European Economic Review 43: 1395–1434.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cukierman, A. and F. Lippi (2001), ‘Labour Markets and Monetary Union: A Strategic Analysis’, The Economic Journal 111 (473): 541–565.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eichengreen, B. and T. Iversen (1999), ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Evidence from the Labour Market’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15 (4): 121–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elmeskov, J., J. Martin and S. Scarpetta (1998), ‘Key Lessons for Labour Market Reforms: Evidence from OECD Countries’ Experiences’, Swedish Economic Policy Review 5: 3–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flanagan, R. J. (1999), ‘Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An International Perspective’, Journal of Economic Literature 37 (3): 1150–1175.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franzese, R. (2001), ‘Institutional and Sectoral Interactions in Monetary Policy and Wage-/PriceBargaining’, in P. Hall and D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 104–144.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garrett, G. and P. Lange (1995), ‘Internationalization, Institutions and Political Change’, International Organization 49 (4): 627–655.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grüner, H. P. and C. Hefeker (1999), ‘How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101 (1): 33–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P. A. and J. R. Franzese (1998), ‘Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Co-ordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union’, International Organization 52 (3): 505–535.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P. A. and D. Soskice (eds.) (2001), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holden, S. (2000), Monetary Regime and the Co-ordination of Wage Setting. University of Oslo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Iversen, T. (1998a), ‘Wage Bargaining, Hard Money and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence for Organized Market Economies’, British Journal of Political Science 28 (1): 31–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Iversen, T. (1998b), ‘Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money’, International Organization 52 (3): 469–504.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Iversen, T. (1999), Contested Economic Institutions. The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Iversen, T., J. Pontusson and D. Soskice (eds.) (1998), ‘Unions, Employers and Central Banks. Macroeconomic Co-ordination and Institutional Change’, in Social Market Economies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jervis, R. (2001), ‘Signaling and Perception’, in Political Psychology, forthcoming.

    Google Scholar 

  • Katzenstein, P. (ed.) (1996), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitschelt, H., P. Lange, G. Marks and J. D. Stephens (eds.) (1999), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knight, J. (1992), Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kydland, F. E. and E. Prescott (1977), ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’, Journal of Political Economy 85: 473–492.

    Google Scholar 

  • Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman (1991), Unemployment. Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Lohmann, S. (1992), ‘Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility Versus Flexibility’, American Economic Review 82: 273–286.

    Google Scholar 

  • March, J. G. and J.P. Olsen (1989), Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matthews, R. C. O. (1986), ‘The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Economic Growth’, Economic Journal 96: 903–918.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Monroe, K. R. (2001), ‘Paradigm Shift: From Rational Choice to Perspective’, International Political Science Review 2: 151–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nickell, S. and R. Layard (1999), ‘Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance’, in O. Ashenfeller and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3C. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 3029–3084.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Olson (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1997), ‘Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy’, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper Series No. 1759.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posen, A. (1996), ‘Declarations are not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence’, in B. S. Bernanke and J. J. Rotemberg (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 253–274.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogoff, K. (1985), ‘The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (4): 1169–1190.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scarpetta, S. (1996), ‘Assessing the Role of Labour Market Policies and Institutional Settings on Unemployment: A Cross-Country Study’, OECD Economic Studies 26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharpf, F. (1997), Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharpf, F. (2000), ‘Institutions in Comparative Policy Research’, MPIfG Working Paper 00 /3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skott, P. (1997), ‘Stagflationary Consequences of Prudent Monetary Policy in a Unionized Economy’, Oxford Economic Papers 49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soskice, D. (1990), ‘Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6: 36–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Soskice, D. and T. Iversen (1998), ‘Multiple Wage-Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14 (3): 110–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Soskice, D. and T. Iversen (2000), ‘The Non Neutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 265–284.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Streek, W. (1997), ‘Beneficial Constraints: On the economic Limits of Rational Voluntarism’, in J. R. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer (eds.), Contemporary Capitalism. The Embeddedness of Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Velasco, A. and V. Guzzo (1999), ‘The Case for a Populist Central Banker’, European Economic Review 43: 1317–1344.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. E. (2000), ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’, Journal of Economic Literature 38: 595–613.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Economic Analysis and Research Section, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, A 1011, Vienna, Austria

    Peter Mooslechner & Martin Schürz

Authors
  1. Peter Mooslechner
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Martin Schürz
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Michigan, USA

    Robert Franzese

  2. Österreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, Austria

    Peter Mooslechner  & Martin Schürz  & 

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Mooslechner, P., Schürz, M. (2003). Institutional Complementarities and Conflicts between Wage Bargaining Institutions and an Independent Central Bank. In: Franzese, R., Mooslechner, P., Schürz, M. (eds) Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-4062-2_12

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-4062-2_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5380-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-4062-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation