The End of Public Enterprises in Europe?

  • Judith Clifton
  • Francisco Comín
  • Daniel Díaz Fuentes


Many analysts agree that the 1970s marked a rupture with the post-war economic model characterised by a mixed economy guided by State regulation based on Keynesian policies.1 The new model of global political economy that emerged was characterised by deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation policies. In this new regime, markets were promoted, while governments were encouraged to ‘roll back’ their intervention into business.2 Some of the most extreme interpretations of this change were that this new phase of globalisation meant the end of the Nation State and economic nationalism that had been dominant since the nineteenth century.3 Also, from a regional perspective, the policies of privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation within the EU (as well as the Americas and Asia) were explained by the redefinition of economic blocs in certain geographical zones, rather than by global market forces.


Stock Market Public Debt Strategic Alliance Public Enterprise Retail Investor 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Judith Clifton
    • 1
    • 2
  • Francisco Comín
    • 3
  • Daniel Díaz Fuentes
    • 4
  1. 1.Universidad de OviedoSpain
  2. 2.Open University and University of LeedsUK
  3. 3.Universidad de Alcalá de HenaresSpain
  4. 4.Universidad de CantabriaSpain

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