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Optimal Monetary Policy in an Optimizing Stochastic Dynamic Model with Sticky Prices

  • Michael Gail
Chapter

Abstract

Recently macroeconomic researchers have begun studying models of optimal monetary policy within the Real Business Cycle (RBC) framework. A standard RBC model is augmented by New Keynesian elements like sticky prices and monopolistically competitive firms. The monetary authority acts as a social planner maximizing the utility of a representative agent while at the same time taking care of the optimal price setting behavior of the firms via an implementation constraint. King and Wolman, 1999 analyze the outcome of such a model with respect to the appropriate monetary policy of the central bank. They conclude that the central bank achieves a complete stabilization of the price level. Inflation is not only constant at the steady state but also through time. It is shown that this very special result does not hold under alternative preference specifications that allow for a richer set of substitution effects between consumption and labor.

Keywords

Monetary Policy Central Bank Price Level Social Planner Money Demand 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Gail
    • 1
  1. 1.Universität SiegenGermany

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