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Crop Insurance as a Tool for Price and Yield Risk Management

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Book cover A Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in U.S. Agriculture

Part of the book series: Natural Resource Management and Policy ((NRMP,volume 23))

Abstract

Agricultural production uncertainty due to events such as drought, frost, insect infestation, and disease is widely recognized. Concern about the effects of this uncertainty on the financial stability of farm firms has generated long-standing interest in providing risk management instruments to protect producers from such production risks. In the United States, crop insurance stands as the most prominent risk-sharing mechanism for agricultural yield risk, while price risk protection has traditionally been afforded through forward pricing instruments such as futures contracts and through price-oriented government programs such as marketing loan programs and deficiency payments. Recent introduction of crop revenue insurance has, however, blurred the separation between mechanisms for price and yield risk protection.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Mississippi State University, USA

    Keith H. Coble & Thomas O. Knight

  2. Texas A&M University, USA

    Keith H. Coble & Thomas O. Knight

Authors
  1. Keith H. Coble
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  2. Thomas O. Knight
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Maryland, College Park, USA

    Richard E. Just

  2. Brigham Young University, USA

    Rulon D. Pope

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Coble, K.H., Knight, T.O. (2002). Crop Insurance as a Tool for Price and Yield Risk Management. In: Just, R.E., Pope, R.D. (eds) A Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in U.S. Agriculture. Natural Resource Management and Policy, vol 23. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3583-3_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3583-3_20

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4924-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3583-3

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