Government and Opposition Weighted Majority Games: An Analysis of the Italian Political Situation
The framework of weighted majority games is considered. Any player is characterized by a program, i.e., a set of projects that he promotes and a set of projects that he opposes. The coalitions among the players are determined by the attempts to realize their programs. Some power indices which consider a model of bargaining similar to that of the Shapley-Shubik index are proposed. An application to the Italian political situation is presented.
KeywordsGame Theory Social Choice Cooperative Game Power Index Coalition Structure
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