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Government and Opposition Weighted Majority Games: An Analysis of the Italian Political Situation

  • Gianni Ricci
  • Salvatore Greco
  • Rosario Vinci
Part of the Advances in Computational Management Science book series (AICM, volume 4)

Abstract

The framework of weighted majority games is considered. Any player is characterized by a program, i.e., a set of projects that he promotes and a set of projects that he opposes. The coalitions among the players are determined by the attempts to realize their programs. Some power indices which consider a model of bargaining similar to that of the Shapley-Shubik index are proposed. An application to the Italian political situation is presented.

Keywords

Game Theory Social Choice Cooperative Game Power Index Coalition Structure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gianni Ricci
  • Salvatore Greco
  • Rosario Vinci

There are no affiliations available

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