Time Consistency in Cooperative Differential Games

  • Steffen Jørgensen
  • Georges Zaccour
Part of the Advances in Computational Management Science book series (AICM, volume 4)


This paper addresses the problem whether a cooperative agreement, made at the start of a game, can be sustained over time. The players can reopen negotiations or reconsider their strategies at any instant of time during the play of the game. Research in differential games has addressed the question of individual rationality over time under headings such as time consistency, dynamic stability, agreeability, or acceptability, and often in an applied context. The question is whether a bargained solution, satisfying individual rationality at the start of the game, will remain individually rational as the state vector evolves over time. The paper collects various research works on intertemporal individual rationality.


Individual Rationality Cooperative Game Differential Game Equilibrium Strategy Time Consistency 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steffen Jørgensen
  • Georges Zaccour

There are no affiliations available

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