Transformations of Games

  • Andrés Perea
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 29)


In this chapter we investigate how rationality criteria for extensive form games react to certain transformations of games, that is, functions which map an extensive form game to some new game. In particular, it is analyzed whether the set of conjecture profiles selected by the criterion in the new game “coincides” with the set of conjecture profiles selected in the original game. If this is the case, we say that the criterion is invariant to the transformation under consideration. Invariance is a desirable property for a rationality criterion if one believes that the transformation does not affect the “strategic features” of the game.


Nash Equilibrium Normal Form Equilibrium Solution Terminal Node Extensive Form 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrés Perea
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.University of MaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Universidad Carlos III de MadridSpain

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