Financial Stability, Regulation, Supervision, and Modern Central Banking

  • Franco Bruni


A reasonable definition of modern central banking would place its beginning during the ‘80s. It had been preceded by a very long period of traditional central banking, which started after the end of classical central banking that can be associated with the “gold standard” and Hume’s “rules of the game”. Obviously, central banking had been in existence, in a more archaic and unsettled form, for a long time before becoming “classical”, dating back to when “it all began” and the central bank of Sweden was founded, 332 years ago. In fact “the Riksbank can claim to be the oldest central bank in the world, beating the Bank of England by a generation” (Deane and Pringle, 1994, p.33).


Monetary Policy Central Banking Asset Price Euro Area Financial Stability 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Franco Bruni
    • 1
  1. 1.Università Commerciale Luigi BocconiItaly

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