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Game Theory pp 299-353 | Cite as

Folk Theorems

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 25)

Abstract

Allegedly elementary theories for the stabilization of cooperatively reachable payoffs by Nash equilibria of the repeated game have been folklore in the sense that no one explicitly claimed the authorship. In a one shot game (the prisoner’s dilemma, the battle of sexes, the chicken game) various Nash equilibria may exist. They may be of different nature, lacking symmetry or providing symmetric and non symmetric solutions. There may be Nash equilibria which are not Pareto efficient and no other ones. This frequently leads to the effect that players are locked in a non efficient equilibrium.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Behavioral Strategy Stochastic Game Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoff Matrix 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BielefeldGermany

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