Abstract
Allegedly elementary theories for the stabilization of cooperatively reachable payoffs by Nash equilibria of the repeated game have been folklore in the sense that no one explicitly claimed the authorship. In a one shot game (the prisoner’s dilemma, the battle of sexes, the chicken game) various Nash equilibria may exist. They may be of different nature, lacking symmetry or providing symmetric and non symmetric solutions. There may be Nash equilibria which are not Pareto efficient and no other ones. This frequently leads to the effect that players are locked in a non efficient equilibrium.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Rosenmüller, J. (2000). Folk Theorems. In: Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 25. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3212-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3212-2_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5114-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3212-2
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