Game Theory pp 211-297 | Cite as

Stochastic Games: Infinite Horizon

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 25)


With the admittance of an infinite duration of a stochastic game a number of most interesting phenomena appear. Of course, we do not believe that players can proceed taking actions in a game infinitely often, rather it is our intuition that we are looking at a model within which the horizon of time is unsurmountably far away and hence the final outcome of the game cannot be taken into consideration. This seems to have a strong impact on the kind of strategic behavior we observe in equilibrium.


Optimal Strategy Behavioral Strategy Stochastic Game Transition Kernel Infinite Horizon 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BielefeldGermany

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