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The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature

  • Jean O. Lanjouw
  • Josh Lerner
Chapter

Abstract

This paper examines several recent avenues of empirical research into the enforcement of intellectual property rights. To frame these issues, we start with a stylized model of the patent litigation process. The bulk of the paper is devoted to linking the empirical literature on patent litigation to the parameters of this model. The four major areas we consider are (i) how the propensity to litigate patents varies with the expected benefits of litigation, (ii) the ways in which the cost of litigation affects the willingness to enforce patents, (iii) how the cost of enforcing patents changes the private value of patent rights, and (iv) the impact of intellectual property litigation on the innovation process itself.

Keywords

Foreign Direct Investment Intellectual Property Intellectual Property Protection International Patent Classification Litigation Cost 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean O. Lanjouw
    • 1
  • Josh Lerner
    • 2
  1. 1.NBERYale UniversityUSA
  2. 2.NBERHavard Business SchoolUSA

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