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Appropriation Strategy and the Motivations to use the Patent System: an Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level in French Manufacturing

  • Emmanuel Duguet
  • Isabelle Kabla
Chapter

Abstract

This paper studies the determinants of both the percentage of innovations that are patented and the number of European patent applications by industrial firms, using data from the French survey on appropriation (EFAT). We build a two equations model including count and interval dependent variables and estimate it by asymptotic least squares. Controlling for the traditional determinants of innovation, like research and development expenditures, we find that patent disclosure is the main reason why firms do not patent all their innovations. Moreover, once we control for the differences in the propensity to patent, patent disclosure also reduces the number of patents applications. On the other hand, the will of firms to acquire a stronger position in technology negotiations and to avoid trials increases the number of patent applications.

Keywords

Patent Application Patent System Patent Document Order Probit Model Industry Dummy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Emmanuel Duguet
    • 1
  • Isabelle Kabla
    • 2
  1. 1.CEMEUniversité de Paris I et INSEE-DMSEFrance
  2. 2.INSEEFrance

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