Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents

  • Claude Crampes
  • Corinne Langinier


This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who knows the characteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has imperfect information about the value of demand.

We study several Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. We find equilibria where the incumbent prefers not to pay the renewal fee for the patent hoping that it will be interpreted by the challenger as a signal of low market profitability.


Information Disclosure Patent System Sequential Game Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Rand Journal 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claude Crampes
    • 1
  • Corinne Langinier
    • 1
  1. 1.IDEI, GREMAQFrance

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