Dynamic Competition and Monopoly Regulation

  • Jerry Ellig
  • Daniel Lin
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 37)


New technologies produce familiar challenges for regulators assessing the causes and consequences of market power. Competition is now possible in most traditional regulated utility industries, which leaves regulators facing many questions previously the province of antitrust experts. In natural gas, telecommunications, and even electricity, regulators and legislators find it increasingly necessary to identify competitors, assess the extent of competition, and craft pro-competitive policies.


Network Effect Path Dependence Telephone Service Dynamic Competition Essential Facility 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jerry Ellig
    • 1
  • Daniel Lin
    • 1
  1. 1.Mercatus CenterGeorge Mason UniversityUSA

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