Preventing Exclusion at the Bottleneck

Structural and Behavioral Approaches
  • Thomas P. Lyon
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 37)


Competition has entered the regulated network industries with a vengeance over the last 15 years. In the natural gas industry, the combination of deregulated wellhead prices and open access to pipeline transportation now supports a robust futures market. In telecommunications, long-distance prices continue to fall as new technologies and corporate restructurings promise even greater competition in the near future. In electricity, bidding markets continue to supplant monopoly provision of power.


Federal Communication Commission Independent System Operator Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Open Access Policy Upstream Market 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas P. Lyon
    • 1
  1. 1.Indiana UniversityUSA

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