Transmission — Enabler of Wholesale Competition

  • Shimon Awerbuch
  • Michael A. Crew
  • Paul R. Kleindorfer
Chapter
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 37)

Abstract

Traditionally, the electric utility industry has been structured as a vertically integrated regulated monopoly. This began to change in the 1980s with the privatization of the industry in the United Kingdom. One important aim of the U.K. privatization was to introduce competition into an industry that previously had been a publicly owned monopoly. A similar process of attempting to open up the industry to competition was set in motion in the United States with the Energy Policy Act of 1992. However, the process is far from complete and agreement as to the structure of the industry currently does not exist. This is nowhere more apparent than in the problem of the organization and ownership of the transmission function, which plays a critical role in enabling competition to take place. Thus, this paper is concerned with governance of transmission networks.

Keywords

Attenuation Assure Expense Argentina Dispatch 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shimon Awerbuch
  • Michael A. Crew
    • 1
  • Paul R. Kleindorfer
    • 2
  1. 1.Center for Research in Regulated Industries Graduate School of ManagementRutgers UniversityUSA
  2. 2.The Wharton SchoolUniversity of PennsylvaniaUSA

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