Abstract
Oligopolies are a fundamental economic market structure, with examples ranging from department stores and large firms in computer, automobile, chemical, or mineral extraction industries to small firms with local markets. Oligopoly theory dates to Cournot (1838), who investigated competition between two producers, the so-called duopoly problem, and is credited with being the first to study noncooperative behavior. In his treatise, the decisions made by the producers are said to be in equilibrium if no one can increase his/her income by unilateral action, given that the other producer does not alter his/her decision.
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Nagurney, A. (1999). Oligopolistic Market Equilibrium. In: Network Economics. Advances in Computational Economics, vol 10. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3005-0_6
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