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“And Their Right Hand is Full of Bribes”

Corruption and Real Estate
  • Jeroen Broeders
  • Jacco Hakfoort
Part of the Research Issues in Real Estate book series (RIRE, volume 5)

Abstract

Where private and public sectors interface, there is always the risk of personal enrichment at the public’s expense. Many real estate transactions and construction projects are characterized by such interactions, which usually involve considerable sums of money. It is therefore not surprising that the real estate business is relatively vulnerable to corrupt activities. In economic models of corruption, the decision to engage in corrupt activities is seen as a tradeoff between the expected gains and costs of such behavior. Using this framework, we address some of the following questions: What factors determine the level of corruption? Why do some sectors of the economy seem more prone to corruption than others? And what should we do about it?

Keywords

Real Estate Organize Crime Construction Industry Public Official Labor Relation Review 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jeroen Broeders
    • 1
  • Jacco Hakfoort
    • 2
  1. 1.AmsterdamNetherlands
  2. 2.Department of Geography and Planning, Faculty of Geographical SciencesUtrecht UniversityNetherlands

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