Personal Control from the Perspective of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory

  • Seymour Epstein
Part of the The Springer Series in Social Clinical Psychology book series (SSSC)


A not unreasonable definition of personal control is the ability of a person to carry out his or her intentions. If I am in control of a situation, I can influence the outcome to come out as I intend. If I am in control of myself I can make myself behave as I intend. Under what circumstances do I not have control? There are several such conditions. First, I may not have the ability to influence the outcome as I wish. I may desire to play the violin magnificently, or to have a devastating tennis serve, but lack the ability to do so. To improve my control I would have to improve my skill.


Rational System Experiential System Personal Control Conceptual System Implicit Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Seymour Epstein
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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