Public Sector Performance Management in a Principal-Agent Context: Some Reflections

  • Geert Bouckaert
Chapter

Abstract

The general principle of division of labor creates the potential to achieve technical (internal) and allocative (external) efficiency. This lies at the heart of a discussion on autonomous agencies and contract management. To be beneficial, a division of labor should result in specialization, and consequently there should be a subsequent step of coordination. Whether this coordination is guaranteed in the market system, in organizations, or in a mix of both, and what kind of information should be used to ensure satisfactory coordination to obtain the full yield of specialization and division of labor, is a major question.

Keywords

Neral OECD Verse 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

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  • Geert Bouckaert

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