Implications of the Intergovernmental Conference and the Treaty of Amsterdam for Small EU Member States

  • Martin Zbinden
Chapter

Abstract

The convocation of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996 was scheduled by the Maastricht Treaty establishing the EU. The reason for this rendez-vous was general agreement on the fact that not all essential questions had been answered in negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty, and that this treaty should, therefore, be revised after several years of experience.

Keywords

Europe Income Expense Candida Defend 

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References

  1. 1.
    The research on which this contribution is based was been carried out mainly at the Robert Schuman Centre (RSC) at the European University Institute in Fiesole/ Florence in 1996–97. It was made possible by a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation. I would like to thank these two institutions and in particular Prof. Yves Mény, director of the RSC, for the support received.Google Scholar
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    The following accession requests came from: Poland (5 April 1994), Romania (22 June 1995), Slovakia (27 June 1995), Latvia (13 October 1995), Estonia (24 November 1995), Lithuania (8 December 1995), Bulgaria (14 December 1995), Czech Republic (17 January 1996), Slovenia (10 June 1996).Google Scholar
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    Denmark, Austria, and Ireland declared basic agreement with the dual majority approach in February 1997, whereas Greece and Sweden seemed to insist a bit longer on mere extrapolation.Google Scholar
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    Notably the Council option of convening the Conciliation Committee after the Parliament’s intention of rejecting the Common Position, and the possibility of the Council submitting its own text after failure of the Conciliation Committee to achieve compromise (third reading).Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    The equality of weighted votes in the Council dual majority would in this sense replace the second Spanish commissioner as the concretization of Spain’s status as a large member state. This arrangement would fulfill the requirement of finding „a solution for the special case of Spain“ in the framework of the first stage of reform stipulated in the Institutional Protocol. Declaration no. 50 of the IGC (Declaration relating to the protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the EU).Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

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  • Martin Zbinden

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