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The Egalitarian Nonpairwise-Averaged Contribution (ENPAC-) Value for TU-Games

  • Theo S. H. Driessen
  • Yukihiko Funaki
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 18)

Abstract

The paper introduces a new solution concept for transferable utility games called the Egalitarian Non-Pairwise-Averaged Contribution (ENPAC-) value. This solution arises from the egalitarian division of the surplus of the overall profits after each participant is conceded to get his pairwise-averaged contribution. Four interpretations of the ENPAC-value are presented. The second part of the paper provides sufficient conditions on the transferable utility game to guarantee that the ENPAC-value coincides with the well-known solution called prenucleolus. The main conditions require that the largest excesses at the ENPAC-value are attained at the (n — 2)-person coalitions, whereas the excesses of (n — 2)-person coalitions at the ENPAC-value do not differ.

Keywords

Cooperative Game Large Excess Solution Concept Grand Coalition Payoff Vector 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Theo S. H. Driessen
    • 1
  • Yukihiko Funaki
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Applied MathematicsUniversity of TwenteEnschedeThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Faculty of EconomicsToyo UniversityTokyo 112Japan

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