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Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance

  • Colin Mayer
Part of the Financial and Monetary Policy Studies book series (FMPS, volume 33)

Abstract

Corporate governance has become a subject of active academic and policy debate throughout the world. In the UK and US, there is much discussion of the deficiencies of the market system in delivering effective governance. In continental Europe, there is a concern that existing systems of governance are stifling innovation and growth. In Eastern Europe, privatization has given way to questions about the way in which private enterprises should be governed. China is experimenting with forms of corporate governance which attempt to blend some of the features of market systems with state ownership of enterprises.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Governance System Corporate Performance Financial Distress Supervisory Board 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Colin Mayer

There are no affiliations available

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