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Banking Regulation as a Solution to Financial Fragility

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Coping with Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk

Part of the book series: Financial and Monetary Policy Studies ((FMPS,volume 30))

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to evaluate the role of government regulation dealing with the risk that fragility of the financial structure may lead to a collapse of the system. Other papers presented at this conference deal with the possible sources of such a collapse—the payments system, international connections, or derivative securities—and with the likelihood that the system is fragile, and the extent to which private solutions maybe adequate to deal with the problem.

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Horvitz, P.M. (1995). Banking Regulation as a Solution to Financial Fragility. In: Benink, H.A. (eds) Coping with Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk. Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, vol 30. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2373-1_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2373-1_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5155-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-2373-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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