Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?

  • Terry L. Anderson
  • Peter J. Hill
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP, volume 1)


Recent years have seen political economists turning to an institutional paradigm wherein the extent to which property rights are defined and enforced is an important determinant of human action. (Furubotn, 1972) The institutional or property rights approach has become an important component of explanations of both economic growth and economic inefficiency. The institutional environment now holds a prominent place in explanations of differential growth rates among political units and over time.1 The property rights approach has also become commonplace in the analysis of the environmental crisis where the lack of well-defined property rights is seen as the cause of environmental problems and movement toward a more complete specification of those rights as the solution. Even bureaucratic inefficiencies have been analyzed in the context of property rights. (McKean, 1965).


Federal Communication Commission Public Land Common Pool Enforcement Activity Minimum Price 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Terry L. Anderson
  • Peter J. Hill

There are no affiliations available

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