Back to the Bog

  • Gordon Tullock
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP, volume 1)


My role in connection with the efficient rent-seeking model (Tullock 1980) is, I think, a rather ill-omened one. I began the discussion by inventing a model with an apparent paradox. The market does not clear even with free entry and competition. There have been a number of efforts to deal with this problem (Corcoran, 1984; I commented on it in the same issue, pp. 95–98). Corcoran and Karels (1985) and Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1985) are further efforts to solve the problem.


Public Choice Normal Return External Cost Marginal Return Free Entry 


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  1. Corcoran, W.J. “Long-run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-seeking.” Public Choice 43, 1 (1984): 89–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Corcoran, W.J., and Karels, G. V. “Rent-seeking Behavior in the Long-run.” Public Choice (1985): 227–246.Google Scholar
  3. Higgins, R.S.; Shughart II, W.F.; and Tollison, R.D. “Free Entry and Efficient Rent-seeking.” Public Choice (1985): 247–258.Google Scholar
  4. Tullock, G. “Efficient Rent-seeking.” In: J.M. Buchanan R.D. Tollison, and G. Tullock (eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society. College Station: Texas A and niversity Press, 1980: 97–112.Google Scholar

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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1988

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  • Gordon Tullock

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