On the Security of Multi-Party Protocols in Distributed Systems

  • Danny Dolev
  • Avi Wigderson


Security of protocols for network communication has received considerable attention in recent years. We concentrate on ensuring the security of cryptographic protocols in distributed systems.

In a distributed system, beyond eavesdropping, a saboteur may impersonate another user or alter messages being sent. A saboteur who is also a user may send conflicting messages or use other illegal messages in order to uncover secret information.

The problem we address, in its most general form, is: “given a multi-party protocol which is provably secure when all the participants monitor every message being sent, can the protocol be modified to be secure in a distributed system?”

We use the Byzantine Agreement, Crusader Agreement, and other specific checks to improve protocols by making them secure in a general distributed network. We examine the trade-off between detection of faulty behaviour and the number of messages exchanged.


Private Information Signature Scheme Secret Information Signed Message Cryptographic Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • Danny Dolev
    • 1
  • Avi Wigderson
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute of Mathematics and Computer ScienceHebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Electrical Engineering and Computer Science DepartmentPrinceton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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