Beyond German Unification
The West has historically struggled to combine coherent military strategies with consistent arms-control policies. The political imperatives of arms control have often taken precedence over clarity in strategic thinking, most starkly in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The excuse for not worrying in the past was the stability derived from the ideological and military division of East and West. After all, military strategies could be changed only on the margin, and arms control offered only limited prospects for moderating the political and military confrontation. Now, political pressures arising from developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are overwhelming both military and arms- control policies. All the uncertainties are providing the excuse for failing to set strategic and arms-control goals.
KeywordsNuclear Weapon Nuclear Force Military Force North Atlantic Treaty Organization Western Government
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Notes and References
- 1.This chapter draws extensively upon the analysis and recommendations in the author’s recent study, Assuring Peace in a Changing World: Critical Choices for the West’s Strategic and Arms Control Policies (Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1990).Google Scholar
- 2.Klaus Wittmann, “Challenges of Conventional Arms Control,” Adelphi Papers 239 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1989).Google Scholar
- 3.This discussion of the objectives for negotiations on short-range nuclear forces draws upon William D. Bajusz and Lisa D. Shaw, “The Forthcoming SNF Negotiations,” Survival (July- August 1990), pp. 333–47.Google Scholar
- 4.The Washington Post, July 7, 1990, p. A18.Google Scholar