The Exploiters Conservationists Game: How to be an Effective Conservationist
An ecosystem model, with exploiters and conservationists is examined in a game-theoretic set up. The Nash-equilibrium solution is derived for two conservation strategies: conservation of the resource and interference with the exploiters’ effort. I show that direct interference leads to a more effective conservation, whereas conservation of the resource, particularly when it is modeled as a rate, leads to de facto subsidy of the exploiters.
KeywordsConservation Effort Ecosystem Model Exploitation Effort Price Sensitivity Strategy Perturbation
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