## Abstract

In a constant environment, evolutionary process should result in evolutionarily stable strategies for the creatures which ultimately survive to inhabit that environment. It is shown here that by adding a strategy dynamic to a previously developed theory, one not only obtains a convenient way of determining evolutionarily stable strategies, but interesting features about the process itself can be observed. Of particular interest, as demonstrated here, progression to evolution arily stable strategies can take place even when the population densities are experiencing chaotic motion.

## Keywords

Mutation Rate Chaotic Motion Evolutionary Game Strategy Change Stable Strategy
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