Daylight Overdrafts: Who Really Bears the Risk?

  • Robert T. Clair
Part of the Innovations in Financial Markets and Institutions book series (IFMI)


Numerous governmental and private-sector studies have addressed the problem of payment system risk in recent years.1 The consensus emerging from those studies is that daylight overdrafts are the primary source of risk in the U.S. electronic payment systems. The institutions that create overdrafts do not bear the full costs, and although recent regulation of the large-dollar transfer systems has reduced somewhat the risk associated with overdrafts, problems remain.


Federal Reserve Payment System Deposit Insurance Federal Reserve System Security Dealer 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

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  • Robert T. Clair

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