Spatial Models of Power and Voting Outcomes

  • Philip D. StraffinJr.
Conference paper
Part of the The IMA Volumes in Mathematics and Its Applications book series (IMA, volume 17)


This article is a brief, subjective guided tour into an area of active, recent work in political science—patial models of voting. We will be concerned with two main questions. The first is how we can measure the power of voters in an asymmetric voting situation. The second is how we can predict or judge the outcome of a voting situation.


Spatial Model Power Index Median Line Condorcet Winner American Political Science Review 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag New York Inc. 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philip D. StraffinJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and Computer ScienceBeloit CollegeBeloitUSA

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