The New Germany and Nuclear Weapons
Strategic studies, a British observer noted two decades ago, “is in some ways a monstrous, pathological subject, distasteful to many, and congenial to only a few.”1 Such a characterization may be particularly appropriate to describe the German attitude toward nuclear deterrence, an attitude that currently is as inconclusive as it is crucial.
KeywordsNuclear Weapon North Atlantic Treaty Organization European Security General Deterrence Nuclear Deterrence
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Notes and References
- 1.John Gamett, Introduction, in John Garnett ed., Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 13.Google Scholar
- 2.“No nukes, no troops” refers to the American political linkage between the deployment of U.S. ground forces and U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany; that is, if those nuclear weapons were withdrawn, presumably at Germany’s request, the troops would follow.Google Scholar
- 3.It has been the common understanding by NATO that this required an increased emphasis on nuclear weapons with longer ranges. The decision to propose a zero solution on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the conclusion of the INF treaty were contrary to the established political guidelines and thus widened the gap between employment and deployment policy.Google Scholar
- 4.Karl Kaiser, “From Nuclear Deterrence to Graduated Conflict Control,” Survival (November/December 1990), p. 492.Google Scholar
- 5.NATO Review, April 1991, p. 31.Google Scholar
- 6.Kaiser, “From Nuclear Deterrence to Graduated Conflict Control,” p. 492.Google Scholar
- 7.Ibid., p. 493.Google Scholar
- 8.“London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” Survival (September/October 1990), p. 471.Google Scholar