Charting the Future Course for Corporate Management of Genetic and Other Health Risks

  • Michael S. Baram


Corporations engage in technological activities of benefit to society and thereby also create new health risks for workers, consumers, and communities. Government regulatory agencies deal with this chronic problem by conducting risk analyses and imposing various duties on private firms. Despite agency efforts and corporate compliance, health risks continue to arise and to take their toll. To what extent will private firms voluntarily assume greater responsibility for preventing these risks? This question is of increasing social importance because the limitations of regulatory efforts are now obvious, whereas health risks are now being identified at what appears to be an increasing rate. This question is also of considerable importance to industry because of the economic impact on private firms of toxic tort actions, workers’ compensation claims, and other “losses” that follow from the health risks.


Corporate Social Responsibility Private Firm Health Risk Assessment Corporate Management Sickle Cell Trait 


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References and Notes

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Copyright information

© Aubrey Milunsky and George J. Annas 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael S. Baram
    • 1
  1. 1.Boston University School of Public HealthBostonUSA

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