Protecting Handicapped Newborns

Who’s in Charge and Who Pays?
  • James F. Childress


Of the two questions assigned to me and indicated in the title of this chapter, I will concentrate on the first question (“Who’s in charge?”), reserving the second question (“Who pays?”) for brief discussion at the end. I shall construe both questions as normative rather than descriptive, as asking who should be in charge and who should pay.


Decision Maker Down Syndrome Neonatal Mortality Procedural Justice Emotional Stability 
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Copyright information

© Aubrey Milunsky and George J. Annas 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • James F. Childress
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Religious StudiesUniversity of VirginiaCharlottesvilleUSA

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