Control Rod Trip Failures; Salem 1, the Cause, Response, and Potential Fixes
The objective of this paper is to address the systems and reliability analysis of recent nuclear reactor control rod failure-to-trip (or scram) events that have been experienced in the U.S. commercial nuclear industry. This viewpoint will introduce the operational factors of hardware, procedures, and the human into the analysis of transients without scram.
KeywordsFault Tree Pressurize Water Reactor Boiling Water Reactor Trip Device Reactor Coolant Pump
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