Abstract
One might ask why there should be special legal rules applicable to the provision of psychiatric emergency services and not other emergency medical services. Aren’t the legal principles the same, regardless of the type of services rendered? Although the same basic legal doctrines apply to both situations, certain important aspects of those doctrines are so pronounced in the case of a mentally disturbed patient that special discussion is warranted. For example, a psychiatric patient may be unable to give a legally valid competent consent to treatment or may pose a greater than average threat of losing control and causing serious physical harm. These characteristics have caused courts and legislatures to accord special treatment to the psychiatric emergency patient. Therefore, in this chapter, we will first describe the law relevant to all medical emergencies and then discuss in detail specific features applicable to psychiatric emergencies.
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Notes
Roe vs Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
Superintendent of Belchertown State School vs Saikewicz, 370 NE 2nd 417, at 426 (Mass, 1977).
Cobbs vs Grant, 502 P2d 1 (Cai, 1972).
Mitchell vs Robinson, 334 SW2d 11 (Mo, 1960).
Marcus vs Liebman, 375 NE2d 486 (111 App Ct, 1978).
Dershowitz, A: Psychiatry in the legal process: A knife that cuts both ways, in Brooks A: Law, Psychiatry and the Mental Health System. Boston, Little Brown and Co, 1974, pp 609, 615.
See, eg., Mass Gen Laws, ch 123, sec 10.
Melville vs Sabbatino, 30 Conn Sup 320, 313 A2d 886 (1973).
Mass 104 CMR 3.04(7) and 104 CMR 3.14(5).
Mass Gen Laws, ch 201, sees 6, 6A, and 14.
NE 2d 40 (1981).
Ibid., at 51.
Rogers vs Commissioner, 390 Mass 489 (1983).
Ibid., at 491.
Ibid., at 507.
NE 2d at 52.
See, eg., W Va Code, ch 16, sec 4C-11.
Rogers vs Okin, 634 F 2d 650 (1st Cir, 1980), at 659; vacated and remanded sub nom Mills vs Rogers, 457 US 291 (1982).
Ibid., at 634 F 2d 659–660.
Ibid., at 660.
In re Richard Roe III, note 11, above, at 54.
Ibid., at 55.
Mass at 491.
Ibid, (footnote omitted).
Ibid., at 510–511.
Ibid., at 511, n 26.
Each of these factors is discussed in In re Richard Roe III, note 11, above, at 56–59.
Ibid., at 59, n 20.
Ibid., at 55.
Tarasoff vs Regents of the University of California, 551 P 2d 334 (Cai, 1976).
Bradley Center vs Wessner, 51 USLW 2275 (Ga Super Ct, 1982); Durflinger vs Artiles, 52 USLW 2361 (Kans Super Ct, 1983 ); Lipari vs Sears Roebuck, 497 F. Supp 185 (D Neb 1980); Mcintosh vs Milane, 168 NJ Super 466 (1979).
Shaw vs Glickman, 415 A2d 625 (Md App 1980).
Mass Gen Laws, ch 119, sec 51 A.
Pa Act of July 9, 1976, PL 817, No 143, sec 301(b), interpreted and applied in Comm ex rei Gibson vs DiGiacinto, 395 A2d 938 (Pa Super Ct, 1978).
S Ct 1804 (1979).
See, eg., Superintendent of Worcester State Hospital vs Hagburg, 374 Mass 271, 372 NE2d 242 (1978).
See Marcus vs Liebman, note 5, above.
In re Richard Roe III, note 11, above, at 61.
O’Connor vs Donaldson, 422 US 563 (1975).
Ibid., at 573.
Romeo vs Youngberg, 644 F2d 147 (3rd Cir, 1980); remanded 102 S Ct 2452 (1982).
Ibid., at 102 S Ct 2459.
See, eg., Wyatt vs Stickney, 325 F Supp 781, 334 F Supp 1341, 344 F Supp 373 (MD Ala, 1971–72); generally affirmed sub nom Wyatt vs Aderholt, 503 F2d, 1305 (5th Cir, 1974 ).
Knecht vs Gillman, 488 F2d 1136 (8th Cir, 1973).
Kaimowitz vs Michigan Department of Mental Health, CA No 73-19434-AW (Cir Ct, Wayne County, Mich, July 10, 1973), summarized at 42 USLW 2063 (July 31, 1973 ).
See, generally, Wyatt vs Stickney, note 43 above.
Rogers vs Commissioner, note 13 above, at 491.
Ibid., at 497–498.
Ibid., at 500, n 14.
See, eg., Rennie vs Klein, 476 F Supp 1294 (D NJ, 1979), affirmed in part, 653 F2d 836 (3rd Cir, 1981); Davis vs Hubbard, 506 F Supp 915 (ND Ohio, 1980); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla, 1980 ); A.E. and R.R. vs Mitchell, C 78–466 (USDC, D Utah, June 12, 1980 ). (Under Utah’s statute, the requisite findings for involuntary commitment include, in effect, a finding that the person being committed is incompetent to consent to treatment.)
Jamison vs Farabee, No C 780445 WHO (USDC, ND Cal, Consent Decree, 4/26/83), reported at 7 Ment Disabil L Rep 436 (1983).
In re Richard Roe III, note 11, above, at 61, n 24.
Brune vs Belinkoff, 354 Mass 102 (1968), at 109.
Mass Gen Laws, ch 111C, sec 13.
Mass Gen Laws, ch 111C, sec 14.
See, eg., Ruben LH: Managing suicidal behavior. JAMA 241(3): 282–284, 1979; Doctor and the law: On expert guidance and the suicide risk. Medical World News, March 1, 1974, Vol 15, p 46E; Cooper TR: Medical treatment facility liable for patient suicide and other self-injury. J Legal Med 3:20–29, 1975; Seiden RH: Suicide among the young: A review of the literature, 1900–1967. Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children, 1969 (A supplement to the bulletin of suicidology). See also Morgan HG: Death Wishes: The Understanding and Management of Deliberate Self-Harm. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1979. In this book, suicide, “fatal self-harm,” is distinguished from other, nonfatal “acute deliberate self-harm.”
Hemlock: A Society Supporting Active Voluntary Euthanasia for the Terminally 111; “The Society for the Right to Die”; and “Exit,” a British group, which, in March 1980, announced plans to publish a manual entitled A Guide to Self-Deliverance, outlining “nonviolent” methods of committing suicide. Science, 1980, 209:1096–1097. Cf. “The American Association of Suicidology,” a “multidisciplinary organization of professionals and non-professionals who share a conviction that the advancement of suicidology will contribute to our knowledge how best to reduce human self-destruction,” and which sponsors a quarterly journal, Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior.
For an exposition of the arguments that led to this repeal, see The punishment of suicide—A need for change. Villanova Law Rev. 14: 463, 1969.
Brooks AD: Law, Psychiatry and the Mental Health System. Boston, Little, Brown and Co, 1974, p 701.
Ibid., at 701.
A California Court of Appeals has held that “ if a person is insane, he cannot form the intent to take his own life”.Thus, “ I nsane persons cannot commit suicide”. Searle vs Allstate Life Insurance Company, as reported by the New York Times, September 4, 1979. This view, although critical to the interpretation of various provisions of insurance policies, is of only semantic interest to this discussion.
Cooper TR: Medical treatment facility liability for patient suicide and other self-injury. J Legal Med 2:20–29, 1975 (quote, 29; footnotes omitted).
Dinnerstein vs United States, 486 F2d 34 (2nd Cir, 1973).
NYS2nd 128 (New York Superior Court, Appeals Division, 1976).
But see discussions above in sections 11 and 13.
Dinnerstein, note 63, above, at 38 (footnotes omitted).
See, eg., Okla Stat Ann, Title 21, sec 818.
Text, above, at note 6.
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Beyer, H.A. (1984). Legal Issues in a Psychiatric Emergency Setting. In: Bassuk, E.L., Birk, A.W. (eds) Emergency Psychiatry. Critical Issues in Psychiatry. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-4751-4_3
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