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G. Ludwig’s Positivistic Reconstruction of the Physical World and His Rejection of Theoretical Concepts

  • A. Kamlah

Abstract

In this paper we investigate some aspects of G. Ludwigs rational reconstruction of physical theories and try to compare his ideas with conceptions of analytical philosophers of science. We shall find striking similarities between Ludwigs philosophy of physics and the neopositivist account of the Vienna Circle before world war II. Ludwig started his philosophical investigation of physics quite independently of the analytical philosophical tradition. He was led to his considerations when he studied the foundations of quantum mechanics and felt a need for a general analysis of physical theories. He used the logic and set theory of Bourbaki as his tool and so his logical terminology differs from that used by analytical philosophers of science. His philosophical vocabulary moreover is completely different from any language ever used by a philosopher. Even quite common words like “hypothesis”, “possible” or “wrong” have nonstanstard meanings in his writing. Therefore his books and papers are not easily understood by the average philosopher of science. Before entering into an examination of his claims, one has to learn Ludwig’s language.

Keywords

Physical Theory Theoretical Concept Theoretical Term Basic Domain Extensional Language 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • A. Kamlah
    • 1
  1. 1.Fachbereich 2Universität OsnabrückOsnabrückFederal Republic of Germany

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