Sneed’s Theory Concept and Vagueness

  • W. Balzer


The discussion of vagueness and approximation in empirical and especially physical theories — as far as it is intended as a part of meta-science — faces the following problem. There are practically no utterances of practising scientists about the relation of theory and approximation which could serve as ‘data’ against which the meta-discussion might be ‘tested’. This is not to say that approximation is not relevant for physics: the very first laboratory courses in physics prove the contrary. The calculation of errors in measurement and the ‘theory of disturbances’ are essential for physical methodology. But these achievements are not suited to clarify the relation between theories and reality.


Intended Application Theory Concept Uniform Space Theoretical Term Empirical Claim 
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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • W. Balzer
    • 1
  1. 1.Seminar für Philosophie, Logik und WissenschaftstheorieUniversität MünchenMünchen 22Federal Republic of Germany

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