A Philosophical Critique of Piaget’s View of Images as Interiorized Actions
Mental imagery, according to Piaget, is a matter of ‘interiorized imitation.’ Since imitation is an activity, his view amounts to the suggestion the images are interiorized actions. But what does that mean? This paper is a philosophical exploration of Piaget’s account of mental images, an attempt to clarify and critically examine his account rather than to offer any alternative theoretical conception of images. I shall try to determine whether Piaget’s views on the subject make any sense, whether they fit together well, and whether they accord with plausible philosophical observations about the nature of mental images.
KeywordsInternal Model Mental Image Mental Imagery Imitative Behavior Philosophical Critique
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Gruber, H. E., and Voneche, J. J. The essential Piaget. New York: Basic Books, 1977.Google Scholar
- Kripke, S. A. Naming and necessity. In D. Davidson, and G. Harmon (Eds.), Semantics of natural language. Boston: D. Reidel, 1972.Google Scholar
- Piaget, J. Play, dreams and imitation. New York: Norton, 1962.Google Scholar
- Piaget, J. Mental images. In H. E. Gruber, and J. J. Voneche (Eds.), The essential Piaget. New York: Basic Books, 1977.Google Scholar
- Plato. Meno. In E. Hamilton, and H. Cairns (Eds.), Plato: The collected dialogues. New York: Pantheon Books, 1961.Google Scholar