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Restricted Access to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

  • Colin W. Clark
Part of the Mathematical Concepts and Methods in Science and Engineering book series (MCSENG)

Abstract

The “tragedy of the commons” (Ref. 1) has proved particularly difficult to counteract in the case of marine fishery resources (Refs. 2–4), where the establishment of individual property rights is virtually out of the question. Common ownership is the fundamental fact affecting almost every regime of fishery management.

Keywords

Fishery Management Differential Game Fishery Resource Yellowfin Tuna Economic Rent 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • Colin W. Clark
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada

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