Advertisement

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Bureaucratic Behavior

  • Dagobert L. Brito
  • Michael D. Intriligator
Part of the Mathematical Concepts and Methods in Science and Engineering book series (MCSENG)

Abstract

Bureaucracy is one of the most pervasive forms of organization for modern society. Such organizations, characterized by large size, a hierarchical structure, and few if any concrete measures of performance, exist in government, industry, universities, nonprofit organizations, and other sectors of modern society.† In the U.S. federal government there are, in fact, many “layers” of bureaucracy. Working from the inner to the outer layers, any individual office in an agency is a bureau, as are the agencies themselves and the cabinet department of which they are part. In industry the different divisions or branches of a corporation can be considered bureaus. In universities the departments can be treated as bureaus.

Keywords

Public Good Median Voter Private Good Budgetary Allocation Allocation Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Downs, A., Inside Bureaucracy, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1968.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Mouzelis, N. P., Organization and Bureaucracy, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 1973.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Niskanen, W. A., Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine—Atherton, Chicago, 1971.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Niskanen, W. A., Jr., Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1973.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Wildavsky, A., The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1964.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Tullocx, G., The Politics of Bureaucracy, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1965.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Gawthrop, L. C., Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive Branch, Free Press, New York, 1969.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Brito, D. L., and Intriligator, M. D., A fixed point approach to multiagent adaptive control, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Vol. 6, pp. 137–145, 1977.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Brrro, D. L., and Intriligator, M. D., Strategic weapons and the allocation of international rights, in Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research. Edited by J. V. Gillespie and D. A. Zinnes, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Brrro, D. L., Buoncristiani, A. M., and Intriligator, M. D., A new approach to the Nash bargaining problem, Econometrica, Vol. 45, pp. 1163–1172, 1977.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dagobert L. Brito
    • 1
  • Michael D. Intriligator
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsTulane UniversityNew OrleansUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of CaliforniaLos AngelesUSA

Personalised recommendations