Royalties and the Extraction Rate of an Exhaustible Resource

  • Jon G. Sutinen
Part of the Mathematical Concepts and Methods in Science and Engineering book series (MCSENG)


An owner of an extractive resource typically does not extract the resource himself, choosing instead to sell extraction rights in the marketplace. For example, the United States government regularly sells extraction rights to coal, uranium, and petroleum on federal lands. A common feature of most extraction rights leases is payment of a royalty to the owner plus, possibly, a fixed-sum payment.†


Extraction Rate Risk Averse Indifference Curve Resource Stock United States Government 
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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jon G. Sutinen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Resource EconomicsUniversity of Rhode IslandKingstonUSA

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