Equilibrium Patterns for Bargaining Under Strike: A Differential Game Model

  • S. Clemhout
  • G. Leitmann
  • H. Y. WanJr.


A class of N-person, general-sum differential games is considered for which non-cooperative Nash equilibria can characterize situations such as bargaining during a strike. A subclass of strategies is shown to be playable equilibria. The existence and uniqueness of this subclass, as well as the possibility of profitable re-contracting, are analyzed and illustrated with examples. Equilibrium implies that any player will eventually fare as well as if he had accepted the claim of all other players at any earlier time. Possible generalizations are outlined or discussed.


Differential Game Equilibrium Strategy Winning Coalition Nash Solution Residual Claim 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1976

Authors and Affiliations

  • S. Clemhout
    • 1
    • 2
  • G. Leitmann
    • 1
    • 2
  • H. Y. WanJr.
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA
  2. 2.University of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA

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