Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations

  • Theodore Groves


Many organizational decision problems may be usefully modeled as the programming problem:
$${\text{P}}:\,\,\,\,\mathop {{\text{Max}}}\limits_{\text{x}} {\text{F}}\left( {\text{x}} \right)$$
subject to G(x) ≤ 0 where x ∈ ℝN, F: ℝN→ℝ, and G : ℝN→ℝK.


Nash Equilibrium Control Mechanism Decision Rule Decision Problem Evaluation Measure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1976

Authors and Affiliations

  • Theodore Groves
    • 1
  1. 1.Northwestern UniversityUSA

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