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Stackelberg Strategies for Multilevel Systems

  • J. B. CruzJr.

Abstract

In this paper we will present a brief sketch of how the leader-follower or Stackelberg strategy concept for two-person dynamic nonzero-sum games might be extended to the coordination of several subsystems. We will also explore how hierarchical control could be formulated in the Stackelberg sense.

Keywords

Differential Game Large Scale System Dynamic Game Hierarchical Control Multilevel System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1976

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. B. CruzJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.Coordinated Science LaboratoryUniversity of IllinoisUrbanaUSA

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