Stackelberg Strategies for Multilevel Systems
In this paper we will present a brief sketch of how the leader-follower or Stackelberg strategy concept for two-person dynamic nonzero-sum games might be extended to the coordination of several subsystems. We will also explore how hierarchical control could be formulated in the Stackelberg sense.
KeywordsDifferential Game Large Scale System Dynamic Game Hierarchical Control Multilevel System
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